Dependence logic, introduced in [8] , cannot be axiomatized. However, first-order consequences of dependence logic sentences can be axiomatized, and this is what we shall do in this paper. We give an explicit axiomatization and prove the respective Completeness Theorem.
Introduction
Dependence logic was introduced in [8] . It extends ordinary first order logic by new atomic formulas =(x 1 , ..., x n , y) with the intuitive meaning that the values of the variables x 1 , ..., x n completely determine the value of y is. This means that the relevant semantic game is a game of imperfect information. A player who picks y and claims that her strategy is a winning strategy should make the choice so that if the strategy is played twice, with the same values for x 1 , ..., x n , then the value of y is the same as well. Dependence logic cannot be axiomatized, for the set of its valid formulas is of the same complexity as that of full second order logic. However, the first order consequences of dependence logic sentences can be axiomatized. In this paper we give such an axiomatization.
Let us quickly review the reason why dependence logic cannot be effectively axiomatized. Consider the sentence 
Preliminaries
In this section we define Dependence Logic (D) and recall some basic results about it.
Definition 1 ([8]). The syntax of D extends the syntax of FO, defined in terms of ∨, ∧, ¬, ∃ and ∀, by new atomic formulas (dependence atoms) of the form
where t 1 , . . . , t n are terms. For a vocabulary τ , D[τ ] denotes the set of τ -formulas of D.
The intuitive meaning of the dependence atom (1) is that the value of the term t n is functionally determined by the values of the terms t 1 , . . . , t n−1 . As singular cases we have =() which we take to be universally true, and =(t) meaning that the value of t is constant.
3
The set Fr(φ) of free variables of a formula φ ∈ D is defined as for first-order logic, except that we have the new case
where Var(t i ) is the set of variables occurring in the term t i . If Fr(φ) = ∅, we call φ a sentence.
In order to define the semantics of D, we first need to define the concept of a team. Let A be a model with domain A. Assignments of A are finite mappings from variables into A. The value of a term t in an assignment s is denoted by t A s . If s is an assignment, x a variable, and a ∈ A, then s(a/x) denotes the assignment (with domain Dom(s) ∪ {x}) which agrees with s everywhere except that it maps x to a.
Let A be a set and {x 1 , . . . , x k } a finite (possibly empty) set of variables. A team X of A with domain Dom(X) = {x 1 , . . . , x k } is any set of assignments from the variables {x 1 , . . . , x k } into the set A. We denote by rel(X) the k-ary relation of A corresponding to X
If X is a team of A, and F : X → A, we use X(F/x n ) to denote the (supplemented) team {s(F (s)/x n ) : s ∈ X} and X(A/x n ) the (duplicated) team {s(a/x n ) : s ∈ X and a ∈ A}. It is convenient to adopt a shorthand notation for teams arising from successive applications of the supplementation and duplication operations, e.g., we abbreviate X(F 1 /x 1 )(A/x 2 )(F 3 /y 1 ) as X(F 1 AF 3 /x 1 x 2 y 1 ).
Our treatment of negation is the following: We call a formula of D first-order if it does not contain any dependence atoms. We assume that the scope of negation is always a first order formula. We could allow negation everywhere, but since negation in dependence logic is treated as dual, it would only result in the introduction of a couple of more rules of the de Morgan type in the definition of semantics, as well as in the definition of the deductive system.
We are now ready to define the semantics of dependence logic. In this definition A |= s φ refers to satisfaction in first-order logic.
Definition 2 ([8])
. Let A be a model and X a team of A. The satisfaction relation A |= X ϕ is defined as follows:
. . . .
Universal quantifier
Existential quantifier
. . . . 
Unnesting:
where z is a new variable.
Dependence distribution: let
where C and D are quantifier-free formulas without dependence atoms, and
Note that the logical form of this rule is:
Dependence introduction:
where z lists the variables in Fr(A) − {x, y}.
Dependence elimination:
where x l = (x l,1 , . . . , x l,m ) and y l = (y l,1 , . . . , y l,n ) for l ∈ {0, 1} ( w 
The usual identity axioms.
It is worth noting that the elimination rule for disjunction is not correct in the context of dependence logic. Therefore we have to assume the rules 1-4 regarding disjunction, which are easily derivable in first-order logic. Note also that the analogues of the rules 1-4 for conjunction need not be assumed since they are easily derivable from the other rules.
Note that we do not assume the so called Armstrong's Axioms for dependence atoms. If we assumed them, we might be able to simplify the dependence elimination and the dependence distribution rules, but we have not pursued this line of thinking.
The Soundness Theorem
In this section we show that the inference rules defined in the previous section are sound for dependence logic.
Proposition 7. Let T ∪ {ψ} be a set of formulas of dependence logic. If
Proof. We will prove the claim using induction on the length of derivation. The soundness of the rules ¬ E, and 2-6 follows from the corresponding logical equivalences proved in [8] and [3] (rules 5-6). Furthermore, the soundness of the rules ∧ E, ∧ I, ∨ I, and rule 1 is obvious. We consider the remaining rules below. The following lemma is needed in the proof.
Lemma 8. Let φ(x) be a formula, and t a term such that in the substitution φ(t/x) no variable of t becomes bound. Then for all A and teams
where
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 3.28 in [8] .
∨ E Assume that we have a natural deduction proof of a first-order formula C from the assumptions {A 1 , . . . , A k } with the last rule ∨ E applied to A ∨ B. Let A and X be such that A |= X A i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By the assumption, we have a shorter deduction of A ∨ B from the same assumptions, and deductions of C from both of the sets {A, A 1 , . . . , A k } and {B, A 1 , . . . , A k }. By the induction assumption, we get that A |= X A ∨ B, and hence X = Y ∪ Z with A |= Y A and A |= Z B. Let s ∈ X, e.g. s ∈ Y . We know A |= Y A. Thus by the induction assumption, we get that A |= Y C, and therefore A |= s C. Analogously, if s ∈ Z, then since A |= Z B we get A |= Z C, and therefore A |= s C. In either case A |= s C, hence A |= X C as wanted.
¬ I Assume that we have a natural deduction proof of a first order formula ¬A from the assumptions {A 1 , . . . , A k } with the last rule ¬ I. Let A and X be such that A |= X A i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By the assumption, we have a shorter deduction of B ∧ ¬B from the assumptions {A, A 1 , . . . , A k }. We claim that now A |= X ¬A, i.e., A |= s ¬A for all s ∈ X. For contradiction, assume that A |= s ¬A for some s ∈ X. Then A |= s A. By Proposition 5, we get that A |= {s} A i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Now, by the induction assumption, we get that A |= s B ∧ ¬B which is a contradiction.
∃ E Assume that we have a natural deduction proof of θ from the assumptions
with last rule ∃ E. Let A and X be such that A |= X A i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
By the assumption, we have shorter proofs of a formula of the form ∃xφ from the assumptions (2) and of θ from
where {A i 1 , . . . , A i l } ⊆ {A 1 , . . . , A k }. Note that the variable x cannot appear free in θ and in A i 1 , . . . , A i l . By the induction assumption, we get that A |= X ∃xφ, hence
for some F : X → A. Since x does not appear free in the formulas A i j , Proposition 4 implies that
for 1 ≤ j ≤ l. By (3) and (4), and the induction assumption, we get that A |= X(F/x) θ and, since x does not appear free in θ, it follows again by Proposition 4 that A |= X θ.
∃ I Assume that we have a natural deduction proof of ∃xψ from the assumptions {A 1 , . . . , A k } with last rule ∃ I. Let A and X be such that A |= X A i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By the assumption, we have a shorter proof of ψ(t/x) from the same assumptions.
By the induction assumption, we get that A |= X ψ(t/x). Lemma 8 now implies that A |= X(F/x) ψ(x), where F (s) = t A s . Therefore, we get A |= X ∃xψ.
∀ E Assume that we have a natural deduction proof of ψ(t/x) from the assumptions {A 1 , . . . , A k } with last rule ∀ E. Let A and X be such that A |= X A i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By the assumption, we have a shorter proof of ∀xψ from the same assumptions. By the induction assumption, we get that A |= X ∀xψ and hence
We need to show A |= X ψ(t/x). We can use Lemma 8 to show this: by Lemma 8, it suffices to show that A |= X(F/x) ψ(x). But now obviously X(F/x) ⊆ X(A/x), hence A |= X(F/x) ψ(x) follows using (5) and Proposition 5.
∀ I Assume that we have a natural deduction proof of ∀xψ from the assumptions {A 1 , . . . , A k } with last rule ∀ I. Let A and X be such that A |= X A i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By the assumption, we have a shorter proof of ψ from the same assumptions. Note that the variable x cannot appear free in the A i 's and hence by Proposition 4 A |= X(A/x) A i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By the induction assumption, we get that A |= X(A/x) ψ, and finally that A |= X ∀xψ as wanted.
Rule 7 Assume that we have a natural deduction proof of ∀y∃x(=( z, x) ∧ φ) from the assumptions {A 1 , . . . , A k } with last rule 7. Let A and X be such that A |= X A i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By the assumption, we have a shorter proof of ∃x∀yφ from the assumptions {A 1 , . . . , A k } and thus by the induction assumption we get A |= X ∃x∀yφ.
By Proposition 4, it follows that
A |= X↾(Fr(φ)−{x,y}) ∃x∀yφ.
Hence there is 
By Proposition 4, we may conclude that
A |= X ∀y∃x(=( z, x) ∧ φ).
In fact, it is straightforward to show that this rule is based on the corresponding logical equivalence:
Rule 8 Assume that we have a natural deduction proof of ψ of the form
from the assumptions {A 1 , . . . , A k } with last rule 8. Let A and X be such that A |= X A i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. By the assumption, we have a shorter proof of
from the same assumptions. By the induction assumption, we get that A |= X φ, hence there are functions F 0,r , 1 ≤ r ≤ n, such that
We can now interpret the variable y 1,r essentially by the same function F 0,r that was used to interpret y 0,r . Suppose that there is 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that y 0,r = y 0,i j . For the sake of bookkeeping, we write w i j as w we denote the tuple arising from w i j by replacing x 0,s by x 1,s and y 0,s by y 1,s , respectively. We can now define F 1,r such that We first show that
holds. The variables in x 0 and y 0 do not appear in B( x 1 , y 1 ), thus (8) holds iff
Now (9) is equivalent to the truth of the second conjunct in (7), modulo renaming (in the team and in the formula) the variables x 0,i and y 0,i by x 1,i and y 1,i , respectively. Hence (8) follows.
Let us then show that
A |= X(ĀF 0ĀF1 / x 0 , y 0 x 1 , y 1 )
13 Let = ( w p , y 0,p ) ∈ S. We need to show that the formula
i.e., the formula (10) and (8) with (7), we get that A |= X ψ as wanted.
The Completeness Theorem
In this section we show that our proof system allows us to derive all first-order consequences of sentences of dependence logic.
The roadmap for the proof
Our method for finding an explicit axiomatization is based on an idea of Jon Barwise [1] . Instead of dependence logic, Barwise considers the related concept of partially ordered quantifier-prefixes. The roadmap to establishing that the axioms are sufficiently strong goes as follows:
1. We will first show that from any sentence φ it is possible to derive a logically equivalent sentence φ ′ that is of the special form
where ψ is quantifier-free formula without dependence atoms.
2. The sentence φ ′ above can be shown to be equivalent, in countable models, to the game expression Φ.
3. The game expression Φ can be approximated by the first-order formulas Φ n (note that the rule 8 applied to φ ′ gives exactly Φ 2 ):
4. Then we show that from the sentence φ ′ of Step 1 it is possible to derive the above approximations Φ n .
5. We then note that if A is a countable recursively saturated (or finite) model, then
6. Finally, we show that for any T ⊆ D and φ ∈ FO:
as follows: For the non-trivial direction, suppose T ⊢ D φ. Let T * consist of all the approximations of the dependence sentences in T . Now T * ∪ {¬φ} is deductively consistent in first order logic, and has therefore a countable recursively saturated model A. But then A |= T ∪ {¬φ}, so T |= φ.
From φ to φ ′ in normal form
In this section we show that from any sentence φ it is possible to derive a logically equivalent sentence φ ′ of the special form
where θ is quantifier-free formula without dependence atoms. Proof. We will establish the claim in several steps. Without loss of generality, we assume that in φ each variable is quantified only once and that, in the dependence atoms of φ, only variables (i.e. no complex terms) occur.
• Step 1. We derive from φ an equivalent sentence in prenex normal form:
where Q i ∈ {∃, ∀} and θ is a quantifier-free formula.
We will prove the claim for every formula φ satisfying the assumptions made in the beginning of the proof and the assumption (if φ has free variables) that no variable appears both free and bound in φ. It suffices to consider the case φ := ψ ∨ θ, since the case of conjunction is analogous and the other cases are trivial.
By the induction assumption, we have derivations ψ ⊢ D ψ * and θ ⊢ D θ * , where
and ψ ≡ ψ * and θ ≡ θ * . Now φ ⊢ D ψ * ∨ θ * , using two applications of the rule 1. Next we prove using induction on m that, from ψ * ∨ θ * , we can derive
Let m = 0. We prove this case again by induction; for n = 0 the claim holds. Suppose that n = l + 1. We assume that Q 1 = ∃. The case Q 1 = ∀ is analogous. The following deduction now shows the claim:
where D1 is the derivation
where D2 is a derivation that swaps the disjuncts. This concludes the proof for the case m = 0.
Assume then that m = k + 1 and that the claim holds for k. Now the following derivation shows the claim: (assume Q 1 = ∃)
where D3 is This concludes the proof.
•
Step 2. Next we show that from a quantifier-free formula θ it is possible to derive an equivalent formula of the form:
where θ * is a quantifier-free formula without dependence atoms. Again we prove the claim using induction on θ. If θ is first-order atomic or negated atomic, then the claim holds. If θ is of the form =( y, x), then rule 5 allows us to derive ∃z(=( y, z) ∧ z = x)
as wanted. such that φ ≡ φ * , ψ ≡ ψ * , and φ 0 and ψ 0 are quantifier-free formulas without dependence atoms, and y i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, does not appear in ψ * and y i , for n + 1 ≤ i ≤ n + m, does not appear in φ * . Now θ ⊢ D ψ * ∨ θ * , using two applications of the rule 1 and rule 6 allows us to derive ∃y 1 . . . ∃y n ∃y n+1 . . . ∃y n+m ( 1≤j≤n+m =( z j , y j ) ∧ (φ 0 ∨ ψ 0 )) which is now equivalent to θ and has the required form. Note that in the case θ := φ ∧ ψ only first-order inference rules for conjunction and ∃ are needed and it is similar to the proof of Step 1.
• Step 3. The deductions in Step 1 and 2 can be combined (from φ to (12), and then from θ to (14)) to show that
• Step 4. We transform the Q-quantifier prefix in (15) to ∀
